BritCard digital identity plan sparks privacy and cost concerns in UK

A government-commissioned digital identity card, potentially required for every adult in Britain, is being described as a forthcoming part of a wider plan that Labour colleagues and the prime minister are positioning as a tool to crack down on illegal working and to streamline access to public services. The initiative, dubbed BritCard in briefing materials, is described as a smartphone-based identity system that could be announced by Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer as early as tomorrow at the Global Progress Action Summit in London, where he will share a podium with Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese and Canadian prime minister Mark Carney. The assertions come as the government signals plans for a consultation and possible legislation to give legal effect to such a scheme. Britain is one of the few European countries without a national ID system, a gap that proponents say would be closed by a digitally driven card.

If unveiled as described, BritCard would likely be accessed via a smartphone app rather than a physical card. Proponents say the digital ID could enable people to prove their identity and their right to work in Britain, while also serving as a key to access public services. A central database would potentially hold tens of millions of records, with biometric details that could be cross-referenced against other data held by government agencies. In line with modern digital ID concepts, the system could leverage facial recognition features already used on phones and in some banking apps. But the plans are at a very early stage, and detailed proposals have not yet been published.

Past attempts to create a national identity system in Britain provide a sobering historical frame. In 2006, Tony Blair’s Labour government passed legislation for a national ID card scheme, with detailed plans published when Jacqui Smith was home secretary. The program went into operation in 2009 under Home Secretary Alan Johnson, issuing credit card–style cards with embedded microchips to a cohort of volunteers at a cost of about £30 per card. The initiative was dismantled by Theresa May the following year, after the general election, by which point roughly £257 million had been spent. The earlier scheme’s rollout and ultimate abandonment have fed concerns that any renewed push could repeat costly missteps and fail to reach compulsory status, even if new lawmakers propose penalties for failing to keep information up to date.

Security and resilience are central questions in any new digital ID plan. A live cross-check against a central database could, in theory, make forgery far harder than with traditional paper documents, since a fraudulent identity would have to match the live data stored on the system. Yet the difficulty and cost of implementing a robust verification ecosystem would hinge on the depth of checks built into the ID. If the government opts for looser verification, the risk of fraud increases. The balance between stringent identity verification and user accessibility will be a major policy test if BritCard moves forward.

Questions about penalties for noncompliance are also unresolved. The last attempt to compulsory register did not include fines for failing to register, in part because the scheme never reached a compulsory stage. Instead, the 2009 framework included penalties for failing to update information, such as a change of address or name, and for failing to surrender a card. It is unclear how Labour would approach penalties in a revamped version, including whether refusals to participate would trigger sanctions beyond information updates. The interplay between civil liberties protections and enforcement powers will be closely scrutinized in any parliamentary process.