Critics Say TikTok Divestiture Framework Falls Short of Law, Risk of CCP Control Persists

A partisan debate over TikTok’s future intensified as lawmakers and security analysts argued that a White House framework does not meet a 2024 mandate to remove Chinese influence from the platform. In 2020, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reached a unanimous conclusion that TikTok is spyware masquerading as entertainment and propaganda masquerading as news, ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Congress then acted in 2024 with broad, bipartisan support to require a sale to American owners or an outright ban. The Supreme Court later upheld that mandate, reinforcing the legal expectation of divestiture or prohibition. Yet the administration has floated a “framework deal” that would allow ByteDance to retain a board seat while leasing its algorithm to a group of American investors. Critics describe this as a capitulation: licensing is not ownership, and monitoring is not control.

The administration argues that the framework would enhance oversight through an American-owned vehicle and by permitting independent audits of the platform’s algorithm through a partner like Oracle. It points to Oracle’s claim that it could fully inspect the TikTok code and data handling. But opponents say inspections can’t verify ongoing manipulation, and that the core technology would still rest with ByteDance in Beijing. They warn that even with a U.S.-based board, Beijing could exercise influence by altering the algorithm remotely, preserving one of the CCP’s most powerful tools to shape American minds and public discourse. This line of argument frames the framework not as a refinement of policy but as a strategic retreat from the law Congress enacted and the Supreme Court affirmed.

The substance of the dispute goes beyond corporate structure. Critics warn that the TikTok algorithm, if under Beijing’s influence, could be used as a vehicle for information operations in a crisis. They point to past episodes in which TikTok appeared to amplify content that favored domestic political division: antisemitic posts after terrorist incidents and celebratory content around political violence following high-profile assassinations. At the same time, content critical of China—such as discussions of the Uyghur genocide, the suppression of Hong Kong, and the Tiananmen Square crackdown—has appeared to be de-emphasized or buried on the platform. By design, the platform’s U.S. experience was not mirrored on the Chinese version, where the same content is banned. In a national-security lens, that asymmetry is central to concerns about information warfare and what a hostile power could do should crisis scenarios unfold with Taiwan or elsewhere on the world stage.

If Beijing retained even partial influence over TikTok’s core algorithm, skeptics warn, Beijing could flood American feeds with messaging that supports CCP positions in time of crisis. A war over Taiwan or another flashpoint could be accompanied by a coordinated public opinion campaign aimed at steering the U.S. response away from intervention. Critics say the administration’s approach effectively acknowledges Beijing’s leverage rather than severing it, signaling to adversaries that the U.S. is willing to negotiate on core security levers in exchange for cosmetic governance changes. The broader risk, they argue, is setting a dangerous precedent: the government could accept loopholes in critical national-security deals and still claim compliance with the law.

Supporters of a tougher line insist the law must be carried out in full, without minority stakes or licensing arrangements that leave the CCP with ongoing influence. Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who specializes in United States-China relations, and Marc Short, former director of Legislative Affairs for President Donald Trump, have argued that the framework undercuts Congress’s authority and undermines sovereignty. They contend that divestiture—no minority stakes and no algorithm leases—remains essential to removing Beijing’s capacity to steer what millions of American children see online. Their stance reflects a broader conservative impulse that national security should be protected by clear, enforceable ownership changes rather than negotiated compromises.

Beyond the immediate policy debate, critics warn that any framework offering continued Chinese influence could complicate other leverage the United States has in technology and trade. Some supporters of a tougher stance frame TikTok as part of a wider contest with Beijing over strategic supplies, including rare earths and advanced chips, where American negotiators seek to extract concessions by tying them to security commitments. The argument is that allowing even partial control of TikTok’s algorithm could invite further demands from Beijing in other settings, potentially diluting U.S. leverage in critical sectors.

The debate remains ongoing as lawmakers examine executive-branch proposals against a clear statutory mandate. The 2024 law’s text remains the touchstone for what constitutes acceptable separation from CCP influence, and the Supreme Court’s affirmation of that mandate adds weight to those who insist that only full divestiture will satisfy national-security concerns. Proponents of a stricter approach say the administration should not proceed with a framework that could be interpreted as compliance with the law while preserving operational channels for Beijing to affect U.S. public opinion.

Traders, policymakers, and the public alike await further steps. The core question is whether TikTok’s ownership and algorithm can be placed beyond Beijing’s reach in a verifiable, auditable manner or whether a more punitive structure—one that eliminates Chinese control entirely—will be required by law. As this issue unfolds, analysts say the outcome will signal how the United States intends to balance commercial innovation, digital freedom, and national security in an era of rapid technological competition with China.