Proposal Would Authorize 'Cyber Privateers' to Strike Back at Scammers

A bill introduced in Congress would authorize the president to issue letters of marque and reprisal allowing private citizens or companies to mount retaliatory operations against members of criminal enterprises involved in cybercrime.

The Scam Farms Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act of 2025 (H.R. 4988), introduced in August by Rep. David Schweikert, R-Ariz., would empower the White House to license private actors to carry out offensive activity against cybercriminals and their conspirators. Proponents portray the measure as a modern analog to privateering, a practice the United States used in the 18th and early 19th centuries to supplement limited naval forces.

Supporters of the approach argue that existing law enforcement and military resources are insufficient to counter the scale and speed of online fraud, phishing and other cyber intrusions that affect individuals and institutions daily. They point to historical precedent: privateers vastly outnumbered and outperformed the fledgling Continental Navy during the American Revolution, capturing more than 2,200 ships compared with 196 taken by naval vessels, according to historical tallies cited by advocates.

The bill follows renewed interest earlier this year in restoring letters of marque, including a proposal from Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah. The idea has attracted voices from the private sector and independent commentators who say a new class of regulated "cyber privateers" could disrupt criminal enterprises more nimbly than traditional government actors. One widely recounted anecdote recalls a private-sector view that a lone skilled attacker with a laptop could outmatch government hardware-centric defenses.

Backers envision a tightly regulated program in which authorized privateers would be licensed and bonded, operate under clear rules and split any seized proceeds with the U.S. Treasury. Some supporters have suggested a detailed code to govern operations, modeled on historical precedents and tailored to cyber realities. Among proposed rules are provisions that would allow seizure of assets belonging to unauthorized attackers, extend forfeiture to funds tied to organized groups or state-directed campaigns, and require an online "right of parley" allowing a designated representative to contest seizures within a set period.

The suggested safeguards would also call for prompt notification, a process for restituting mistakenly seized funds and punitive compensation to innocent victims if assets were not returned on schedule. Proponents argue such rules would limit collateral harm, create accountability and provide victims with recourse while deterring repeat offenders.

Legal scholars, cyber policy experts and some lawmakers caution that the proposal raises substantial legal, technical and diplomatic problems. Under current U.S. law, unauthorized access to computer systems and retaliatory hacking by private actors are criminal offenses. Reviving letters of marque would require clear statutory authority, new regulatory frameworks, and detailed oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse.

Attribution remains a central technical obstacle. Cyber operations often involve anonymizing techniques, false flags and intermediaries, complicating reliable identification of targets. Experts warn that misattribution could lead to seizures from innocent parties, cross-border incidents or escalation with foreign governments. Diplomatic fallout is a concern if operations target infrastructure or assets tied to other states, potentially breaching sovereign immunity or international law norms.

Security analysts also warn of risks tied to privatization of offensive cyber capabilities. Licensed privateers might abscond with proceeds, be co-opted by criminal networks, or themselves engage in unlawful conduct. The possibility of violent reprisals or criminal retaliation against private actors and their families, cited by some proponents as a practical risk, has also been raised as a reason for strong oversight and protection for authorized operators.

Advocates counter that current reporting and prosecution rates for many forms of cyber-enabled fraud are low and that individuals and small businesses often receive little relief. They argue that a regulated privateering model could provide faster takedown of scam infrastructure, recover stolen funds and shift economic incentives against large, organized cybercriminal enterprises.

Congressional debate is likely to center on whether the risks of delegating offensive cyber activity to non-state actors can be managed through statutory limitations, licensing standards, judicial review and transparency requirements. Lawmakers will also weigh questions about coordination with existing federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community, and about how to align any new authority with international legal obligations.

The bill’s introduction signals growing interest in unconventional responses to persistent cybercrime, but it also prompts a broader discussion about the role of private actors in offensive cyber operations, the capacity of government institutions to protect the public, and the legal contours of state-sanctioned retaliation in the digital age. As H.R. 4988 moves through committee consideration and public hearings, lawmakers, specialists and civil society groups are expected to scrutinize whether a modern "cyber privateer" regime can deliver accountability without creating new vectors for abuse.