Studies claiming most political violence is right-wing are bogus, op-ed argues

A New York Post op-ed questions the widely cited claim that right-wing violence accounts for the bulk of political violence in the United States. The piece argues that prominent surveys and lists of extremism rely on questionable classifications and ambiguous motives, and that ideology is not always the driver of what are labeled as politically motivated crimes.

The author, David Harsanyi, a senior writer at the Washington Examiner, focuses on the ADL's Murder and Extremism in the United States report. He contends that the report tallies a small set of murders as extremist, with the vast majority attributed to right-wing actors, but he argues many of those cases were non-ideological crimes in which perpetrators were identified as possible white supremacists based on tattoos or other signals rather than established political motivation. He notes that in only one of the 11 right-wing cases was the motive clearly ideological. This framing, he writes, inflates the appearance of right-wing extremism while downplaying other forms of violence.

The op-ed raises questions about how some incidents are classified. It argues that the only characteristic linking several incidents to the right is the perpetrators’ alleged white supremacist associations, a criterion it says does not demonstrate that the acts were intended to advance white-supremacist goals or to constitute right-wing political terrorism. It also cites cases where there is little evidence of ideological motive, such as violence connected to attempted prison escapes, sex offenses, robberies, or family disputes, which the author says should not be categorized as political violence.

The author points to a notable example to illustrate potential misclassification: the assassination of a high-profile business executive, for which the shooter left a manifesto expressing anti-capitalist views. The piece notes that, despite that ideological framing, the event was not included in ADL's list as a left-wing attack. The implication, the author writes, is that political violence data are not a neutral reflection of reality but a product of definitional choices and omissions that can tilt the balance of reported violence toward one side.

The piece also argues that not all violence can be interpreted through a political lens. It cites cases in which attackers acted alone, had mental-health histories, or pursued personal grievances that do not reflect a broader political movement. Supporters of both sides have acknowledged that extremists exist on the right and the left; the author cautions against treating every violent act as a political statement. Critics of such surveys say that data sets like the FBI's and the Global Terrorism Database face similar challenges in categorizing motives and assigning blame, and that those methodological issues are often overlooked.

The author also suggests that even if some violence were disproportionately labeled as right-wing, it would not justify sweeping generalizations about mainstream conservative politics. He notes that a swastika tattoo or other indicators do not equate to the beliefs of most conservatives, and that violent deeds by individuals associated with the far left sometimes receive less attention or are differently classified. The argument, according to the piece, is not that political extremism does not exist on any side, but that a broad claim about right-wing predominance rests on contested data and ambiguous motives.

David Harsanyi, the article's author, is a senior writer at the Washington Examiner. The piece appears in a New York Post op-ed column, contributing to a broader debate about how political violence is measured and understood in U.S. politics.