Belarus proposes second nuclear plant to supply energy to Russian-occupied Ukraine
Lukashenko says the plant could power regions controlled by Moscow in Ukraine, with Putin publicly backing the idea; no financing details were disclosed.
Belarus has unveiled a proposal to build a second nuclear power plant that could supply energy to Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, a plan the country’s president presented during a Kremlin meeting with Vladimir Putin. The disclosure comes as Minsk seeks to bolster its energy and political ties with Moscow amid the broader war in Ukraine and ongoing questions about cross-border energy arrangements.
The plan envisions a new plant capable of delivering electricity to Ukrainian territories that are currently controlled by Russia, including the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions. Lukashenko indicated that the plant could be used if needed to support those areas, signaling that Belarus views the project within the context of Moscow’s wartime objectives in Ukraine. Putin publicly expressed support for the idea at the meeting, though the Russian side did not specify whether it would provide financial backing for a second plant.
Belarus opened its first nuclear power plant, the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant, in November 2020. Astravets was built by Rosatom, the Russian state atomic energy corporation, with a loan of about $10 billion from Moscow. The project has been a focal point of energy and security discussions in the region, highlighting how Belarus and Russia have used their close ties to advance shared strategic priorities in Eastern Europe.
Lukashenko, who has led Belarus for more than three decades, has long been a staunch ally of the Kremlin. He has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a staging ground for Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and later authorized the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear missiles on Belarusian soil. The new plant proposal sits within a broader pattern of closer security and energy cooperation between Minsk and Moscow, a relationship that has drawn scrutiny from Western governments and energy analysts about regional stability and export dynamics.
The Friday discussions at the Kremlin did not include a firm commitment on financing from Russia for a second plant, and no timeline for construction was announced. Russian officials have historically tied such inquiries to broader geopolitical considerations, including the alignment of energy supply with Moscow’s strategic imperatives in and around Ukraine. Belarusian officials offered no immediate confirmation of a financing package and did not outline a construction schedule, leaving the proposal at the level of strategic intent rather than an imminent project.
Observers note that the Aspen-like cross-border energy question is entwined with the ongoing conflict and political calculations in both Belarus and Russia. The proposal underscores how Belarus’s energy infrastructure could intersect with Moscow’s military and political objectives, particularly in the context of Ukraine’s contested territories and the broader struggle over energy leverage in Europe. Analysts have long pointed to Rosatom’s role in Belarus’s nuclear infrastructure as a sign of the deepening integration of Belarusian energy policy with Russian state interests, a dynamic that has implications for regional energy security and regional diplomacy.
The broader backdrop remains volatile. Belarus’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its decision to host Russian missiles on its territory have repeatedly drawn international concern about escalation risks and regional stability. The proposed second plant adds another layer to that calculus, suggesting potential joint energy projects that could be deployed as part of a wider network of energy and military coordination between Moscow and Minsk. Whether the proposal moves beyond a theoretical plan to a concrete development will depend on a complex mix of technical, financial, and geopolitical factors, including Russia’s willingness to finance or subsidize a new plant and the strategic calculations of Belarus’s leadership.
If realized, the project would raise questions about energy sovereignty and the governance of cross-border electricity trade in a conflict zone. It would also test Western reactions to Belarus’s continued deepening energy ties with Russia and its potential use as a conduit for supporting Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine. For now, officials in Minsk and Moscow describe the plan in broad terms, emphasizing strategic purpose over a defined timetable, while Kyiv and Western partners continue to monitor shifts in energy policy that could affect the conflict’s energy landscape and regional stability.
The proposal thus sits at the intersection of energy policy, security strategy, and regional geopolitics. As Belarus and Russia navigate a dual track of cooperation and coercion, the question remains how durable and legally sustainable any cross-border energy arrangements would be in a war-torn region. Until there are detailed proposals, funding commitments, and regulatory clearances, the plan will likely remain a strategic option under consideration rather than an imminent project on the horizon.