China-linked drone experts tied to Russia’s Kupol deepen collaboration on military drones

Chinese drone experts have flown to Russia to conduct technical development work on military drones at IEMZ Kupol, a state-owned arms manufacturer that remains under Western sanctions, according to two European security officials and documents reviewed by Reuters. The officials said the visits, which began in the second quarter of last year, occurred on more than six occasions, and during that period Kupol also received shipments of Chinese-made attack and surveillance drones via a Russian intermediary. The collaboration, researchers say, points to a deepening relationship between Kupol and Chinese companies in developing drones that have become central to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Kupol’s tally of drone imports includes more than a dozen one-way attack drones produced by Sichuan AEE that were billed to Kupol in 2024, the procurement through which they were delivered by the Russian company TSK Vektor, now under U.S. and EU sanctions. The companies involved did not respond to requests for comment. Separately, documents reviewed by Reuters showed shipments of additional AEE drones, including the A140 and A900, along with models such as the A60, A100, and A200 that were due for delivery. The flow of Chinese-made hardware to Kupol’s facilities underscores how China has become a critical supplier of components and mature tech for Russia’s drone program.

European officials described the Chinese involvement as not merely transactional but technical, with flight-test activity and staff exchanges designed to adapt and integrate Chinese drone platforms for Russian use. A Kupol document said Chinese experts visited the Izhevsk facility to assemble drones and train Kupol personnel, before traveling to Chebarkul in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region for further testing. Airline records reviewed by Reuters showed the visitors left Chelyabinsk the day after the tests. Invoices reviewed by Reuters indicate that AEE billed TSK Vektor more than 5 million yuan in the second quarter of 2025 for several A200 drones equipped with anti-jamming gear, along with other equipment. It remains unclear what role Kupol or Russian partners played beyond the tests and training described in the documents, and Reuters could not independently determine the exact nature of the Chinese experts’ work or their official designation.

Two separate lines of evidence connect Chinese firms to Kupol’s drone development: a Hik Haoyuan Haotianyi and a close partner network that has included TSK Vektor as a conduit for shipments, and a broader pattern of Chinese technical staff accompanying Russian buyers on site. In a third-quarter 2024–2025 timeline, Kupol’s internal correspondence described flight-test work on a new flight-control computer and a new engine for the Garpiya, a drone model that has drawn scrutiny for its similarity to other well-known one-way attack drones. A more recent note described visits by Chinese engineers—described as TSK Vektor employees in some Kupol records but assessed by European officials as Haotianyi staff—during which the Garpiya’s control system and powerplant were targeted for adaptation. The same set of letters also referenced work on a drone dubbed GA-21, which European analysts believe is a Shahed-107-style platform intended for surveillance and strike missions.

A separate line of inquiries points to a second Chinese supplier involved in Kupol’s testing regime: Hunan Haotianyi, whose HW52V VTOL drone—capable of both reconnaissance and strike missions—was described in a third-quarter report as undergoing Russian flight tests under the auspices of Kupol and TSK Vektor. Footage and travel records show Liu Mingxing, Haotianyi’s chief executive, and Artem Vysotksy, head of TSK Vektor’s drone department, flying together from Irkutsk after a Haotianyi event. Neither Haotianyi nor Vektor responded to requests for comment. Reuters was unable to confirm whether those on the trip were Haotianyi staff, though European officials noted several Haotianyi executives accompanied Liu during Russia visits.

The European officials said the third quarter of 2025 saw another wave of Chinese personnel visit Kupol facilities, with letters noting that they would work on a new drone referred to as GA-21, in addition to ongoing Garpiya work. They assessed the GA-21 as a variant of Iran’s Shahed-107, capable of both reconnaissance and strike roles. The officials stressed that the documents do not establish the exact scope of dual-use technology transfers, and they cautioned that the information could reflect internal planning rather than a fully realized program.

China’s Foreign Ministry said it was unaware of this collaboration. The ministry asserted that China maintains an objective and fair position on the Ukraine crisis and does not provide lethal weapons to any party, noting strict controls on dual-use items, including drones. The Kremlin, the Russian defense ministry, and Kupol did not respond to requests for comment. The approach to drone transfers sits within a broader pattern of Western concern about Chinese companies supplying Russian arms makers, and several firms have been hit with sanctions in recent years. U.S. and European authorities have repeatedly flagged such ties as a risk to global security and to the integrity of sanctions regimes.

The investigation comes as analysts emphasize how China has become a critical supplier of drone components and technology for Russia. Samuel Bendett, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, said China has assumed a vital role in Russia’s drone supply chain, underscoring the extensive use of Chinese components in Russian aerial platforms. He noted that the integration of Chinese flight-control systems and engines into Russian drones has been a persistent feature of the two countries’ defense collaboration.

Drones have become increasingly central to Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, with Kyiv and Western officials citing the rapid scaling of the Garpiya family and related models. Kyiv has said that hundreds of Garpiya drones were being produced and deployed monthly, illustrating how foreign suppliers have underpinned Russia’s ability to sustain long-range strike capability in the conflict. The new details about Chinese involvement add to a growing picture of Beijing’s role in supporting and facilitating Russia’s drone program through not just parts but also technical expertise and design assistance.

As the war continues, Western governments say that controlling the flow of dual-use drone technology remains a priority. The Vatican of the drone program appears to hinge on a complex web of suppliers and intermediaries, with Kupol acting as a focal point for integrating Chinese platforms into Russia’s newer generation of unmanned systems. The ongoing debate over China’s role in Russia’s drone development will likely complicate Western efforts to constrict and monitor arms transfers as sanctions regimes evolve and new drone technologies emerge. In the meantime, researchers caution against drawing definitive conclusions from procurement records and training notes alone, noting that the information reflects a snapshot of a dynamic, evolving collaboration that could shift as the conflict continues.