China unveils expanded nuclear triad at WWII parade as U.S. weighs deterrence

China rejected a U.S. invitation to discuss nuclear arms reductions and instead leveraged a World War II victory parade in Beijing to publicly showcase an expanded nuclear arsenal and related military technologies. The event, held on Sept. 3, 2025, coincided with Beijing’s commemoration of the war’s end and drew high-profile attendees including Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. In a display designed to highlight capability and resolve, the Chinese military presented a full nuclear delivery triad: silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, an air-launched ballistic missile, and a submarine-launched ballistic missile. The parade also featured a wide array of missiles, including YJ‑19 hypersonic anti-ship systems deployed by maritime forces, underscoring Beijing’s emphasis on multi-domain deterrence.

The event comes amid a broader debate over China’s nuclear posture. Beijing has repeatedly asserted a minimum deterrence framework and a no-first-use policy, arguing that its arsenal is kept deliberately small and restrained. Yet experts and adversary observers have long cautioned that China’s modernization program—coupled with diversifying delivery platforms and accelerating readiness levels—amounts to more than nominal deterrence. The parade’s showcase of diverse systems, including rapid-infrastructure capability, has reinforced concerns that China plans to be able to threaten U.S. ships, bases and allies in a future crisis.

Analysts point to a detailed assessment in a 2024 annual Department of Defense report to Congress, which described China’s nuclear force as including low-yield precision strike missiles and strategic systems with multi-megaton yields, designed to provide options across every rung of the escalation ladder. The DoD report projected China would exceed 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, with many deployed at higher readiness levels and continued growth through 2035 as part of a broader effort to modernize the People’s Liberation Army and pursue a “world-class” military by 2049. The document also noted China’s pursuit of fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce plutonium for weapons, signaling a push beyond a traditional “minimum” deterrent toward a capability to sustain a larger, more diverse arsenal.

In commentary accompanying the parade, former U.S. officials warned that China’s posture reflects a strategic breakout of sorts. Retired U.S. Strategic Command leaders and other defense observers have argued that while China publicly claims a minimum deterrent and no-first-use policy, its actual modernization trajectory could enable a broader set of nuclear and conventional options. One widely cited perspective from past years warned that China was building the capability to execute a wider range of plausible nuclear employment strategies, including coercive options against U.S. assets and allies. Those views emphasize the importance of looking past stated policies to discern real intent through ongoing modernization, force structure changes and the diversification of delivery systems.

The elevated pace of modernization has raised questions about how the United States should adapt its own deterrent posture. DoD officials have stressed the need to modernize command, control, and communications and to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise, including delivery systems and associated infrastructure. The 2024 DoD report noted the importance of updating U.S. capabilities to deter both China and Russia, given the possibility of conflict involving more than one major nuclear power. It also highlighted that China’s arsenal could include dual-capable, conventional-nuclear platforms and a broader range of engagement options than in the past, complicating calculations about escalation and deterrence.

The parade’s spectacle also underscored the international dynamic around arms control and deterrence. China’s leadership has underscored its intent to strengthen its military modernization while maintaining an outward message of restraint, even as its actions appear to outpace previously stated policies. The gathering in Beijing, which drew Xi, Putin, Kim, and Sharif, underscored the integration of China’s strategic ambitions with broader international partnerships and signaling among major powers.

Analysts warn that the implications extend beyond Beijing’s borders. If Washington views China’s evolving nuclear posture as a challenge to regional and global security, it could lead to increased investment in U.S. capabilities to deter multiple adversaries or to reassure allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Observers emphasize that the United States must consider a comprehensive approach that includes modernization of its own nuclear force, potential revisiting of existing arms-control frameworks, and strengthening alliance commitments—without relying on any single policy instrument to ensure stability.

With the 2030 and 2035 milestones on China’s horizon and the ongoing evolution of its missile forces and dual-capable systems, the international community continues to monitor Beijing’s messaging and capabilities in parallel with Washington’s responses. The World continues to watch how these developments influence regional security calculations, alliance dynamics, and the broader trajectory of strategic stability in the 21st century.