Israel urged to shift defense doctrine to preemptive strikes to prevent Hamas rebuilding, as Gaza war enters new phase

As Israel marks the second anniversary of Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack, its current Gaza campaign has intensified, with ground forces moving into Gaza City amid ongoing airstrikes and a broader campaign aimed at crippling Hamas as both a military force and governing authority. Forty-eight hostages remain in Hamas custody, including 20 believed alive, a toll that underscores the high stakes of the conflict as it enters a new phase. The latest offensive follows a week after Israel targeted Hamas leaders in Doha, marking a shift in gray-area diplomacy and military pressure as the war drags on two years after the crisis began.

In their new book, While Israel Slept: How Hamas Surprised the Most Powerful Military in the Middle East, co-authors Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot trace Hamas’s ascent from its origins in the 1980s through decades of Israeli operations to the Oct. 7 rampage that caught the country by surprise. They document alarm bells that sounded the night of Oct. 6—reports of rocket launcher activity and bunkers being readied for commanders—and warn that the signs had been visible for years, signaling that Hamas was not a conventional external threat but a persistent and evolving adversary. The authors argue that understanding Hamas’s long-term military buildup is essential to shaping the next stage of the conflict.

The book lays out three pillars that defined Israel’s containment strategy in recent years. First, a belief that Hamas could be bought off through economic incentives, including monthly payments from Qatar and the allowance for Gazans to work inside Israel, in the hope that prosperity would soften the group’s extremist aims. Second, technology and deterrence—primarily Iron Dome interceptors and a robust border barrier designed to stop tunnels and rockets from reaching Israeli soil. Third, a strategic prioritization of threats beyond Gaza, notably Iran and Hezbollah, which led to resources and attention being concentrated on those rivals rather than on Hamas and its operational capabilities in Gaza. The authors recount how Israel’s leadership believed this approach would keep Hamas contained while focusing military effort on higher-priority threats. Yet Oct. 7 revealed a stark reversal: fighters crossed the border above ground in large numbers, exploiting a breach that indicated both the scale of Hamas’s capabilities and the limits of the containment model.

The authors contend that the containment policy collapsed on Oct. 7 and has continued to shape the war’s cost and trajectory. Israel’s response—its ongoing ground offensive and sustained air campaign—has not produced a quick, decisive end to Hamas’s rule in Gaza, and the war has generated mounting international concern about civilians and regional stability. The authors say that the proof of the containment failure lies not only in battlefield outcomes but also in the persistence of hostage-taking and the political and economic isolation Israel has faced as a result of the conflict. The recent strike on Hamas leaders in Doha is interpreted in the book as a signal that high-value targets still matter, even if they are not eliminated in a single operation. The authors suggest that such strikes could alter Hamas calculations by underscoring that leaders are not secure in any safe haven, whether in Doha or elsewhere.

Amid these dynamics, Katz and Bohbot argue that eliminating Hamas and securing the hostages are not sufficient by themselves to ensure long-term peace or prevent a future crisis. They call for a fundamental shift in Israel’s defense doctrine toward preemptive strikes designed to prevent Hamas and Hezbollah from rebuilding once the high-intensity phase of war subsides. The authors argue that preemption should become a structured, ongoing pillar of defense policy rather than a last-resort tactic. The historical record, they say, shows that Israel has rarely taken preemptive action against adversaries with significant buildup—whether Syria’s chemical programs in the 1980s and 1990s, or Hezbollah’s growing arsenal after the 2006 Lebanon War—despite clear indicators. In the book, the authors highlight exceptions only in cases where perceived existential threats forced preemptive action, contrasting those moments with missed opportunities in other regional contests.

The analysis emphasizes that the current crisis is not solely about ending one war or rescuing a set of hostages; it is about redefining how Israel guards against a future recurrence of such a catastrophe. If talks collapse or if Hamas escalates retaliation against captives, the absence of a parallel diplomatic track could render a military maneuver—such as resuming a Gaza City offensive—reckless or self-defeating. The authors warn that without a parallel push to dismantle Hamas’s governance structure and a credible path to a broader regional settlement, the risk remains that the group will rebuild its capabilities and reemerge after any lull in fighting.

Ultimately, Katz and Bohbot present a stark conclusion: the only way to ensure that the horror of October 7 is not repeated is to adopt preemptive action as a core, enduring pillar of Israel’s defense doctrine. This would require clear thresholds, legal and ethical guardrails, and credible diplomatic channels to manage the risks of escalation and international exposure. The authors acknowledge that such a shift would be controversial and complex, but they argue it is necessary to prevent future catastrophes and to alter the strategic calculus of Hamas and its allies. The Atlantic-level threat assessment that underpins their argument is rooted in decades of open-source analysis and firsthand reporting, including the timeline of the conflict and the persistence of hostages.

Yaakov Katz is the co-author of While Israel Slept, published by St. Martin’s Press, and this book forms the backbone of the authors’ critique of Israel’s policy of containment and their call for a preemptive shift in doctrine. The war’s trajectory remains uncertain, but the authors’ message is clear: a strategic pivot toward preemption could become the defining factor in whether Hamas, Hezbollah, or other adversaries rebuild after the current round of fighting.

Image: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Jerusalem

The high-stakes debate now centers on whether Israel can or should adjust its defense posture without undermining regional stability or triggering broader conflict. If the path forward hinges on preemptive action, it will require careful calibration, sustained international engagement, and a credible, enforceable framework to prevent escalation while ensuring that Hamas cannot resume hostilities at will. The discussion also underscores the broader geopolitical contours of the conflict, including how regional players respond to shifts in Israeli strategy and how such shifts influence negotiations with Gaza’s governing authorities.

As the situation continues to unfold, the central question remains whether Israel will adopt a more aggressive, preemptive approach as a formal element of defense policy, or whether it will pursue a more conventional trajectory that could leave it, in the authors’ view, vulnerable to another attack in the future. The coming months are likely to test the authors’ argument about the necessity of a new doctrine as much as they test the resolve of the parties involved.

Image: Flames erupting from a building following an Israeli strike