Russia helping China prepare for potential Taiwan invasion, think tank says

LONDON — Russia is selling military equipment and technology to China that could help Beijing prepare for an airborne invasion of Taiwan, according to an analysis of leaked Russian documents by the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. The authors say the documents, about 800 pages in all, include contracts and equipment lists that were handed to the think tank by the Black Moon hacktivist group. The group has previously published material online and describes itself as opposed to governments that carry out aggressive foreign policy. The RUSI researchers say some documents appear genuine, though parts could have been omitted or altered. The Associated Press could not independently verify the documents’ authenticity. The analysis notes meetings between Chinese and Russian delegations, including visits to Moscow, as well as payment and delivery timelines for high-altitude parachute systems and amphibious assault vehicles. While the documents do not directly reference Taiwan, the authors argue the equipment and training could help China develop advanced airborne capabilities it would need to mount an invasion.

The core of the disclosure centers on a package described as a complete set of equipment for an airborne battalion, plus training and procedures for command and control of parachute forces. The package includes 37 light amphibious assault vehicles, 11 amphibious anti-tank self-propelled guns and 11 airborne armored personnel carriers, along with command and observation vehicles. The total price is listed at more than $210 million. Beijing reportedly intends for the vehicles to be equipped with Chinese communication systems and to use Chinese ammunition. The documents also reference the Dalnolyot system, a parachuting capability described as capable of dropping up to 190 kilograms (419 pounds) from very high altitude.

According to the documents, Russia would provide testing on the Dalnolyot system under extreme cold conditions, including temperatures from –40 C to –60 C, with testing for drops from 8,000 meters (about 26,250 feet) that could allow airdropped forces to glide up to 80 kilometers (about 50 miles). The materials say Beijing requested such testing and would use the results to plan infiltration by Chinese special forces, potentially allowing “stage zero” landings in Taiwan by aircraft operating outside Taiwanese airspace. The analysis notes that the ability to drop heavy equipment from high altitude would be coupled with training and procedures that could help ensure reliable command and control of parachute forces, an area where Russia’s combat experience is cited as a comparative advantage.

The timeline referenced in the documents places an initial agreement in April 2021, with stages one and two—covering analysis of technical specifications, software modifications and equipment manufacturing—said to be complete by the time the documents were prepared. Russia is described as agreeing to train Chinese personnel and to provide a full set of equipment for an airborne battalion, with the capacity to infiltrate by special forces. The documents indicate that the plan anticipated payments and deliveries continuing through 2024, including details about how the systems would function in colder environments and how they would integrate with Chinese military systems. The analysis notes that the end of 2024 could see Russia delivering the system specifics and training, though it does not indicate whether the equipment had actually changed hands.

Danylyuk, a former Ukrainian defense official who collaborated on the RUSI report, said the greatest value of the deal is likely in the training and procedures for command and control of parachute forces, given Russia’s combat experience compared with China’s. He and co-author Jack Watling argue the collaboration would position Moscow as a military supplier to Beijing and could help fund Russia’s own war in Ukraine. Yet Danylyuk cautioned that Moscow may have other aims as well, including the possibility of drawing Beijing into a confrontation with Washington that could divert attention from Russia’s war. “The Chinese school of airborne landing is very young,” he noted, suggesting Moscow’s involvement could accelerate China’s airborne program by about 10 to 15 years.

China’s leaders have repeatedly asserted a modernization program aimed at turning its armed forces into a world-class military by 2050. Beijing has not ruled out seizing Taiwan by force and contends the self-governing island is part of China. The documents themselves do not mention Taiwan directly, but the analysis argues that access to Russian equipment and localized training in China would make Beijing better prepared for a potential invasion, even if a formal decision to invade had not yet been made. The authors say the deal’s value lies in training and procedures that would enable a better-coordinated airborne operation, rather than in a single piece of hardware.

The report also highlights a potential strategic dynamic: even as China’s overall military capabilities have advanced, the analysis suggests gaps in airborne operations that Moscow could help fill. Russia has a long history of airborne forces dating back decades, and the authors say China has been seeking to gain know-how in areas like parachuting, infiltration, and air-landed operations. Still, some observers noted that Russia’s own application of airborne tactics in Ukraine has fallen short of expectations in several high-profile cases, including the February 2022 attempt to seize Hostomel airfield near Kyiv and other airborne operations that did not unfold as Moscow had planned.

Song Zhongping, a military commentator in Beijing, acknowledged China’s generally superior equipment but noted Russia’s greater combat experience. He said the two countries have complementary strengths: China’s modernization and equipment advantages alongside Russia’s seasoned personnel and operational know-how. “Russia and China have their own relative strengths in paratrooping,” Song said, adding that joint air and sea patrols and drills show they are learning from each other to address weaknesses. Analysts say such cooperation could accelerate China’s development of airborne capabilities and help Beijing close gaps in areas where Moscow’s experience is viewed as valuable.

In one scenario contemplated by the analysis, Chinese planners could conduct a “stage zero” landing in Taiwan by dropping armored vehicles on golf courses near Taiwanese ports and airfields, thereby enabling airborne troops to secure a corridor for larger landings. The authors stress that such a scenario would depend on a broad set of preconditions, including successful suppression of Taiwan’s air defenses and the ability to sustain logistics for a rapid buildup of forces. They caution that the report’s conclusions about timing and feasibility are contingent on many political and military variables and that no government has publicly confirmed any of the transactions described.

The authors also emphasize that the documents do not prove Beijing has paid for or taken possession of any equipment, or that China has formally decided to invade Taiwan. They note that the papers describe meetings, payments and delivery schedules but may not reflect final decisions or actual transfers. The Kremlin, China’s foreign ministry, and Taiwan’s defense ministry did not respond to requests for comment, and the U.S. government did not offer an official confirmation of the documents’ veracity. However, the analysis states that the documents align with broader patterns of China’s ongoing efforts to modernize its armed forces, while Russia seeks to position itself as a major supplier to Beijing amid its own war in Ukraine.

The report arrives as high-ranking U.S. officials have suggested that Xi Jinping has signaled willingness to have the People’s Liberation Army prepared for a possible invasion of Taiwan as early as 2027. Beijing maintains that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve unification. Analysts caution that even with access to Russian equipment and training, China faces substantial challenges in projecting power across the Taiwan Strait, including the need to suppress Taiwan’s air defenses, secure air and sea control, and sustain a long-range logistics footprint to support a rapid invasion.

The leaked documents also come at a time of broader concern about the security implications of state-backed technology transfers and the role of non-state groups in disseminating sensitive material. While the Black Moon group has claimed to act independently of government policy, researchers say the materials it released raise questions about how such information could influence regional security dynamics if verified. The AP contributed reporting from Beijing and Bangkok on this developing story, and additional corroboration from other outlets remains ongoing.