Russian-funded disinformation network seeks to disrupt Moldova election, BBC investigation finds

A secret Russian-funded network sought to disrupt Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections by paying participants to post pro-Russian propaganda and to conduct an unofficial poll, the BBC’s investigation has found. The operation was conducted in the name of a non-existent organization, and the network’s activities included covertly recording supporters of the pro-Russian opposition. The BBC says the results of the so-called poll, which suggested the ruling party would lose, were published online even before an official poll could confirm the outcome. Moldova’s pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity, or PAS, is currently ahead in official surveys, even as the Kremlin-linked opposition tries to raise questions about the fairness of the vote.

The BBC’s World Service infiltrated the network through Telegram after a whistleblower provided a link, gaining insight into how such propaganda ecosystems operate. An undercover reporter, codenamed Ana, and 34 recruits were invited to attend secret online seminars billed as preparatory sessions for operatives. The sessions carried titles like “How to go from your kitchen to national leader,” which the BBC described as a vetting process. Ana and the others were required to pass regular tests on what they had learned.

The network’s coordinator, identified as Alina Juc, told Ana she would be paid 3,000 Moldovan lei a month (about $170, £125) to produce TikTok and Facebook posts in the run-up to the election. She said payments would come from Promsvyazbank, the sanctioned Russian state-owned bank that serves as the official bank for the Russian defence ministry and is linked to one of Ilan Shor’s companies. Ana and other recruits were instructed to use ChatGPT to craft posts, but with guidance to avoid making posts feel artificial by keeping AI use to a minimum and maintaining a sense of authenticity.

Within a Telegram group, the BBC reviewed prior instructions sent to participants. Initially, recruits were asked to post patriotic content about Moldovan history, but the directives soon shifted toward overt political manipulation. Ana was directed to spread unfounded claims about the current government’s alleged plans to falsify election results, to imply that Moldova’s EU accession depends on adopting LGBTQ+ rights, and to accuse President Maia Sandu of facilitating child trafficking. An example of the disinformation the network urged its operatives to share included phrases such as “Sandu’s regime uses children as a living currency” and “SanduPAS is involved in human trafficking.”

The BBC found the operation comprised at least 90 TikTok accounts, some masquerading as news outlets, that posted thousands of videos reaching more than 23 million views and attracting about 860,000 likes since January. The Global Disinformation Lab, or DFRLab, estimates the broader network could be larger still, with more than 55 million views and over 2.2 million likes on TikTok since the start of the year. Moldova’s population is about 2.4 million, underscoring the reach of this covert influence campaign.

The network did not limit itself to social media posts. It also offered wage-based, unofficial polling tasks to Ana, paying 200 Moldovan lei (about $12, £9) per hour to conduct informal interviews in Moldova’s capital, and to secretly film respondents who expressed support for the pro-Russian opposition. Participants were trained on how to sway respondents subtly, and the survey results, if the pro-EU PAS won, were framed as evidence that the election had been unfairly influenced. The BBC says the interviews and recordings were intended to bolster a post-election narrative, should that outcome favor the PAS.

Evidence also suggests the operation received foreign backing. Ana overheard and filmed Alina Juc discussing money from Moscow to pay participants. The BBC found links between the network and Ilan Shor, a Moldovan oligarch sanctioned by the United States for Kremlin influence operations and currently a fugitive in Moscow. There are also connections to Evrazia, a non-profit organization sanctioned by the UK, US, and EU for allegedly bribing Moldovan citizens to vote against EU membership last year. Evrazia is listed in the BBC’s reporting as having ties to Shor and to the network’s financing channels.

The BBC said it shared its findings with the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), which cautioned that the network could be larger than identified in Moldova. Officials have described Evrazia as operating in Moldova on behalf of Ilan Shor to destabilize Moldovan democracy, a claim the UK Foreign Office has publicly supported. In response to questions about the investigation, Ilan Shor and Evrazia did not reply. BBC notes that it did not publish disinformation from Moldova’s PAS supporters and limited the number of posts used in the undercover exercise to confirm patterns rather than amplify content.

TikTok said it had implemented additional safety and security measures ahead of Moldova’s elections and would continue to counter deceptive behavior. Facebook’s parent company, Meta, did not respond to the BBC’s inquiries. The Russian embassy in London denied involvement in fake news or electoral interference, saying that the EU was the one interfering in Moldova’s election.

Moldova’s police chief, Viorel Cernauteanu, told the BBC World Service that, in 2024, Shor shifted focus from money-based campaigning to disinformation, underscoring how the dynamics of influence campaigns evolve ahead of elections. Moldova, a small country bordered by Ukraine and Romania, holds strategic significance for Europe and the Kremlin, according to security experts who spoke to the BBC.

The investigation comes as Moldova prepares for parliamentary elections on September 28. While the official polls have shown PAS ahead, the discovery of a Russia-backed network attempting to seed disinformation and to conduct covert polls raises questions about the integrity of information surrounding the campaign. Observers note that Moscow has long sought to destabilize nearby democracies and to tilt European political outcomes in its favor, particularly through disinformation, political funding, and leveraging proxies.

The BBC emphasized that it took steps to avoid spreading disinformation during the undercover phase. The network’s alleged monetization model—paying operatives for content and for poll-related activities—highlights the financial incentives behind modern influence campaigns. Moldova’s vote, and its potential to influence the region’s political trajectory, remains a focal point for Western governments and regional security organizations monitoring Kremlin messaging and interference tactics.