Syria’s Ahmad al-Sharaa Makes U.N. Debut as Regime Seeks Legitimacy Amid Deep Divisions

Ahmad al-Sharaa arrived in New York this week to address the United Nations General Assembly, marking a milestone in a remarkable and accelerating transformation. For years, he was known publicly as the shadowy figure Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the head of Syria’s al-Qaeda–linked network, a man with a reported $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. Since late 2024, however, Sharaa has been the face of a government that, after a sweeping and controversial shift in power, seeks to reframe its legitimacy on the world stage while grappling with a country torn by war and competing centers of authority.

The arrival in New York and the warm reception he has received abroad underscore the extent to which the international community has embraced his government’s survival and its bid for sanctions relief and reconstruction aid. Sharaa’s supporters point to a diplomatic string of engagements: the Syrian diaspora’s welcome in major capitals, and high-profile audiences with former U.S. generals and policymakers. Even as some Western capitals remained cautious early on, a Saudi-brokered meeting between Sharaa and then-President Donald Trump in May helped to tilt Washington toward a more favorable posture, with Trump praising the new leader as a “tough, attractive guy.” In public and private channels, the administration that followed continued to signal openness to engagement and reconstruction assistance, contingent on conditions that include broader legitimacy and accountability.

This week in New York, Sharaa is expected to present a case for further sanctions relief and international backing for a unified Syria. The emphasis on external legitimacy has, in the first months of his tenure, yielded tangible gains: a rollback of some sanctions and a reestablishment of diplomatic ties with key regional players. Yet the domestic foundation of that legitimacy remains fragile. Sharaa’s government consolidated authority quickly after a tumultuous period in late 2024, when a major offensive by allied groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham fractured the Syrian military’s defenses. Damascus briefly fissured as rebels captured the capital on December 8, and President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow before Sharaa emerged as the de facto leader. The international attention now lavished on Sharaa risks masking the degree to which real power remains concentrated in a tight circle centered on his inner circle and former members of allied militias.

[Image embedded here for context: Ahmad al-Sharaa at the U.N. General Assembly in New York City.]

Internally, Sharaa’s approach has prioritized external legitimacy over public address to Syrians. He has often been less visible at home, preferring to push diplomacy abroad and stage symbolic displays of national unity with foreign dignitaries. That strategy has won broad international recognition for Syria’s post-Assad political framework and helped secure sanctions relief and foreign investment announcements that the regime says will drive reconstruction. But it has also left many Syrians wondering who benefits from the new order—and how inclusive the government’s governance will prove in practice.

Domestically, the new political structure rests on a framework designed to stabilize the country while signaling a transition. In January, Sharaa was named president by acclamation at a gathering of rebel commanders, who declared an end to armed opposition factions. A national dialogue conference followed in February, but it was short and criticized for lacking depth and broad participation. In March, the government unveiled an interim constitution that guarantees expansive presidential authority during a planned five-year transition, including provisions that concentrate power in Sharaa’s hands. Parliamentary elections are slated, yet the process will be indirect and tightly controlled, with one-third of seats reserved for appointment by the presidency. Critics say the arrangement risks entrenching a centralized leadership while marginalizing voices from across Syria’s diverse civic spectrum.

Sharaa’s domestic legitimacy is further complicated by a country whose social fabric remains fractured along sectarian and ethnic lines. Sunnis, who form a majority, share space with Alawites, Christians, Druze, Kurds and other groups that have long feared marginalization under a centralized, Syria-wide project. Even as Sharaa’s government asserts control over large urban centers, it has struggled to extend authority into peripheries where former opposition factions and local power brokers retain influence. In the coast, government forces and allied militias halted an uprising in March, but the operation was followed by a massacre that local rights groups identified as targeting Alawite communities, underscoring the precariousness of security and communal trust. In Suweida, a Druze-majority governorate where authorities attempted to reassert control in July, Israeli military intervention helped compel a withdrawal, highlighting how regional dynamics constrain Damascus’s reach. The northeast remains largely under Kurdish-led forces, and plans to integrate these areas into a centralized Syrian state have stalled, strengthening perceptions that a true, durable federation or compromise remains distant.

The international community’s enthusiasm for Sharaa’s government is not universal. U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack has emerged as a leading booster, repeatedly signaling that there is “no plan B” to Sharaa’s approach and that Washington remains committed to supporting a unified Syria under his leadership. That stance, however, has at times complicated the broader goal of building a durable, inclusive political order. Reports from the field indicate that some actions by Damascus and its regional supporters—such as the isolation or punishment of dissenting voices and the targeting of minority communities—have fueled concerns that the regime’s long-term legitimacy rests more on coercive power than on broad-based popular consent. In this context, Barrack’s advocacy for a centralized government has drawn concern from minority groups and international observers who worry about the risk of renewed entrenchment and renewed cycles of tension.

Economically, Syria remains deeply damaged by years of war and crushing sanctions. The new government has highlighted large foreign investment as a centerpiece of its reconstruction narrative, yet investors and ordinary Syrians alike remain wary about how quickly benefits will trickle down. The economy, though improved in some sectors, continues to lack the structural capacity required for a full rebound: a currency in flux, a shattered industrial base, and ongoing disruption in energy and transport networks. While the regime touts a brighter medium- and long-term outlook, immediate relief for average Syrians is inconsistent, with humanitarian needs persisting across many regions. This gap between international rhetoric and domestic reality has reinforced calls from international partners for a governance model that balances security with meaningful political inclusion and accountability.

The risk for the international community is clear: supporting a single faction’s roadmap for national unity could inadvertently deepen divisions if it comes with insufficient oversight or a lack of accountability for past and current abuses. Advocates of a more inclusive process argue that legitimacy cannot be earned solely by rendering external recognition; it must be earned by delivering tangible protections and rights for all Syrians, including minority communities that have long faced displacement and disenfranchisement. The coming months at the United Nations are likely to set the tone for how far external actors will press Damascus to adopt measures that promote broader political participation, transparent governance, and a credible path toward reconciliation.

As Ahmad al-Sharaa makes his case this week in New York, policymakers and observers will be watching not only for signals of renewed sanctions relief or prospective investment, but also for concrete steps that demonstrate the regime’s willingness to expand dialogue with civil society and to address the grievances that have sustained Syria’s multiple fronts. The U.N. stage offers a platform to project an image of a legitimate, unified Syria, but the real test will be whether the government can translate that image into policies that restore trust among minorities, local communities, and international partners alike. If the international community pressures Damascus to deliver inclusive reforms and accountability, there is a possibility for gradual stabilization. If not, the risk remains that fragmentation and conflict will endure, drawing in regional actors and reshaping the broader political landscape in the Middle East for years to come.