The Shaky Future of the Abraham Accords: Gulf states recalibrate amid Gaza war and Doha strike

The Abraham Accords, signed Sept. 15, 2020, promised to redefine regional security and commerce by normalizing Israel's relations with Gulf states. Five years later, the accords face renewed stress as Israel's war in Gaza intensifies and the region recalibrates how best to balance security needs with public sentiment and long-standing Palestinian aims. In the early years, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain vaulted into a new era of cooperation: public menorah lightings, kosher restaurants, and joint academic programs, alongside ministers, business leaders and security officials from both sides building a practical, trade-oriented framework. Emirati officials, including Youssef al-Otaiba, the UAE's ambassador to the United States, framed the rapprochement as a path to stability and prosperity for the Gulf. Palestinians and their supporters have long viewed the accords with concern, arguing that normalization without a Palestinian state undermines their prospects. The initial years also served as a test of how much regional stability could be traded for normalization, and how much the Gulf would tolerate Israel's security and political moves.

The honeymoon produced tangible signs of cross-border engagement: Emirati youth delegations visiting Israel, Israeli and Emirati scholars sharing research at conferences across Abu Dhabi, and ordinary residents encountering routines built around a new sense of connection. In central Dubai, a billboard inviting visitors to Visit Israel stood as a striking symbol of the new vocabulary. In December 2021, the Dubai metro carried Hasidic Jews in their hats and payot, a scene that would have been unimaginable a decade earlier. By March 2023, Abu Dhabi's Abrahamic Family House, a combined synagogue, church and mosque complex, opened as a centerpiece of the normalization effort. The facility underscored the Gulf’s willingness to display inclusive religious spaces, while the broader economic and technological links tied the region to Israel's growing markets. Yet in the background the Palestinian question persisted, and the region grew wary of overreaching ambitions amid regional competition and external pressure.

The September 9 strike—which hit a Hamas negotiation venue in Doha as part of a broader Gaza-related campaign—drew sharp international attention and highlighted the risks associated with rapid militarization of the region. The United States, which maintains its largest Middle East base in Qatar and views Qatar as a key security partner, urged restraint while continuing to press for hostage releases and a ceasefire. The attack killed five Hamas members and one Qatari security guard; the Hamas leaders involved survived. The flare of violence prompted swift condemnations from Gulf capitals and spurred a high-level Gulf delegation to visit Doha to signal that channels for diplomacy remain open. Qatar, in turn, asked Abu Dhabi and Manama to close their Israeli embassies—a move not echoed by the UAE or Bahrain, illustrating differing approaches within the framework of normalization. The episode underscored the gulf states’ concern that Israel’s regional posture could undermine stability and complicate mediation efforts with Hamas and Iran. It also exposed misjudgments in some Israeli expectations about how Gulf partners would respond to bold actions aimed at reshaping the regional balance of power.

Looking ahead, the Accords are unlikely to collapse, but their foundations are being recalibrated. People-to-people ties, which flourished during the early years, cooled after Israel’s actions in East Jerusalem and Gaza drew broad regional sympathy. Yet the UAE and Bahrain continue to see value in normalization: it provides access to Israeli technology, defense partnerships, and a gateway to Washington’s security umbrella, while keeping Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Manama as hubs for global business. Qatar remains a central, if cautious, mediator whose leverage depends on maintaining open lines with Israel and its allies while pursuing its own diplomatic and economic diversification. The broader calculus for the Gulf is to preserve a stable, if more guarded, trajectory that can weather shifting regional alignments.

The United States remains a central actor in Gulf diplomacy, with its security guarantees and diplomatic clout shaping how far Gulf states are willing to push normalization in a volatile region. As Gaza conflicts and new regional flashpoints emerge, the Accords’ staying power will depend on whether political leaders can prevent escalation while maintaining the economic and technological ties that made normalization attractive in the first place. The Gulf states have shown they are capable of recalibrating their positions in response to risk, and they will likely continue to do so in the years ahead, balancing long-standing commitments to the Palestinian cause with the pragmatic benefits of cooperation with Israel and with one another. The outcome will reveal not a simple verdict on the Accords, but a recalibrated architecture of regional diplomacy that could endure even if its aura of novelty fades.