US universities training Chinese military scientists on taxpayer dime, committee warns

A congressional committee warned that U.S. universities are educating thousands of Chinese nationals with ties to the Chinese military, funded in part by American taxpayers. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party said that at one university more than 400 Chinese nationals were conducting federally funded research in sensitive fields such as nuclear engineering and computer science. At another campus, investigators found that half of Chinese Ph.D. students on site were involved in federally funded research. Every university surveyed—Maryland, Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Carnegie Mellon, the University of Southern California, Purdue, and Stanford—admitted students from China’s top military and defense research schools, including the so-called Seven Sons of National Defense.

At Beihang University, on the U.S. Entity List since 2001, investigators noted nine major defense laboratories and an adherence to Xi Jinping Thought. Beihang students were found at every U.S. university surveyed, the committee said, and similar ties extended to Harbin Institute of Technology and Northwestern Polytechnical University, which maintain extensive defense laboratories and collaborations with state-owned weapons conglomerates. Beihang, in particular, was highlighted for its long-standing defense connections and for its academics’ presence on U.S. campuses.

The investigation also examined collaborations at the University of Maryland, where officials said more than 25% of Chinese students enrolled in fall 2024 were involved in federally funded research, though the university added it does not track the exact nature of each student’s work. At Illinois, the UIUC ran a joint engineering institute with Zhejiang University, an institution tied to China’s defense establishment and intelligence services. UIUC announced it would terminate dozens of agreements with Chinese universities, shut down its flagship joint engineering institute with Zhejiang University, terminate all joint degree programs, end several priority admission agreements, and halt a summer faculty training program with Shanghai institutions. Purdue, meanwhile, hosted 16 visiting faculty from Chinese universities in sensitive departments such as electrical engineering and computer science, and at least six Purdue faculty members were on sabbatical in China, including two at institutions overseen by Beijing’s defense ministry and another at a State Key Laboratory, institutions described as central nodes in China’s military‑civil fusion system. Purdue has since adopted new safeguards to prevent foreign influence, banning foreign adversary funding, tightening research security and export controls, adding protections for intellectual property, and restricting sabbaticals with Chinese institutions. The committee praised Purdue’s reforms as a model for others.

In Maryland and Purdue, officials reported a broader pattern of faculty collaborations that raised questions about oversight. Maryland cited at least 89 faculty partnerships and 15 exchange agreements with Chinese entities, while Purdue noted numerous visiting scholars in sensitive fields. Officials acknowledged gaps in distinguishing casual academic contact from long‑term research ties, leaving oversight vulnerable to foreign influence. The committee also noted Purdue’s experience with sabbaticals, and highlighted six Purdue faculty sabbaticals in China, including assignments at institutions associated with China’s defense ministry or its State Key Laboratories. The university’s corrective actions — including prohibiting certain foreign funding, tightening research security, and exporting controls — were portrayed as a constructive step, but the panel urged broader adoption of similar safeguards across the system.

The report also pointed to other actions by universities in recent years. UIUC’s decision to unwind its Zhejiang University joint institute, shutter joint degree programs, and end a set of priority admission agreements followed congressional scrutiny. Some campuses have also begun winding down partnerships with the China Scholarship Council, a government‑funded student program the committee described as part of Beijing’s technology transfer apparatus. “We cannot allow America’s taxpayer‑funded research labs and classrooms to serve as staging grounds for Beijing’s military ambitions,” said House Select Committee Chairman John Moolenaar.

The committee’s findings come amid a broader set of prosecutions and enforcement actions. In June, two Chinese students at the University of Michigan faced charges in a biopathogen case after attempting to bring restricted materials into the United States. In July, other Chinese students were convicted for spying after drones were flown over the Norfolk Naval Station, and additional cases in Michigan involved attempts to gain access to U.S. military installations. Those cases, the report notes, underscore that the risk is not purely theoretical. Other universities have already responded by unwinding ties with Chinese institutions. UC Berkeley, Georgia Tech, and the University of Michigan have canceled joint institutes or collaboration programs under congressional scrutiny, a trend lawmakers say reflects sustained pressure on higher education to reevaluate foreign ties.

The committee argued that the Biden administration has not fully enforced an executive order signed by President Donald Trump in 2020—the order that aimed to bar Chinese nationals engaged in military‑linked research from certain U.S. programs. The order’s rationale, as described by the committee, is that Chinese authorities use postgraduate students as “non-traditional collectors” of intelligence information. The report calls for codifying that order into law, tightening visa screening, and barring Chinese nationals from participating in U.S. government‑funded research labs. It also urges universities to disclose foreign student affiliations and funding sources to federal agencies. The panel’s final recommendations include stronger project vetting, clearer distinctions between short-term collaboration and long-term research, and more aggressive disengagement from the China Scholarship Council.

If reforms are not enacted, the committee warned, American higher education could continue training scientists and engineers “not for America’s benefit, but for the PLA.” The panel urged lawmakers to act promptly to restore safeguards, and to provide universities with clearer leadership on foreign influence policies as part of a broader national strategy to contest China’s expanding influence in science and technology. In its closing notes, the committee highlighted Purdue’s example of tightening controls and pledged to continue monitoring partnerships, funding disclosures, and enforcement actions across the sector.